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Abstract—Enterprises have recognised the importance of per- 
sonal mobile devices for business and  official  use.  Employees 
and consumers have been freely accessing resources and services 
from their principal organisation and  partners’ businesses on 
their mobile devices, to improve the efficiency and productivity 
of their businesses. This mobile computing-based business model 
has one major challenge, that of ascertaining and linking users’ 
identities and access rights across business partners. The parent 
organisation owns all the confidential information about users 
but the collaborative organisation has to verify users’ identities 
and access rights to allow access to their services and resources. 
This challenge involves resolving how to communicate users’ 
identities to collaborative organisations without sending their 
confidential information. Several generic Identity and Access 
Management (IAM) standards have been proposed, and three 
have become established standards: Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML), Open Authentication (OAuth), and OpenID 
Connect (OIDC). Mobile computing and communication have 
some specific requirements and limitations; therefore, this paper 
evaluates these IAM standards to ascertain suitable IAM to 
protect mobile computing and communication. This evaluation 
is based on the three types of analyses: comparative analysis, 
suitability analysis and security vulnerability analysis of SAML, 
OAuth and OIDC. 
Keywords—Mobile Computing and Communication; Identity 
and Access Management; IAM; SAML; OAuth; OpenID Connect; 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile computing and communication enables enterprises 
and consumers the flexibility to conduct their work at a time 
and place which is convenient (anytime, anywhere), increasing 
productivity and efficiency. However, this flexibility of mobile 
devices in the enterprise presents additional security challenges 
[1]. The biggest issue is to securely authenticate and authorize 
staff and clients among all the collaborative organisations [2]. 
The parent organisation owns all the confidential information 
about users but collaborative organisations have to verify users’ 
identities and access rights to permit access to  their  ser- 
vices and resources. This challenge involves resolving how to 
transmit users’ identities to collaborative organisations without 
sending their confidential information. The Identity and Access 
Management (IAM) standard can be used as an effective 
solution for authenticating and authorizing users across all 
collaborative organisations [1]. 
IAM standards have been developed to support all au- 
thentication and authorization activities at a corporate level. 
IAM service providers offer a wide range of activities such 
as user creation, user activation, user authentication, user 
authorization, user activity monitoring, application usage, user 
provisioning, user deprovisioning, user auditing, and user 
revocation [3], [4]. There are various IAM standards avail- 
able, of which, the established and effective IAM standards 
are SAML, OAuth, and OIDC. These three IAM standards 
cover the majority of the IAM marketplace. Currently, iden- 
tity management services became a stand-alone IT function 
known as IDaaS (Identity-as-a-Service). Mobile computing 
and communications have several challenges such as mobility, 
resource scarcity, heterogeneity, and insecure wireless mobile 
communication [5], [6]. To consider these limitations, the IAM 
standard for mobile computing requires some adaptations such 
as lightweight protocols, energy efficiency, native mobile app 
support and robust security [7], [8]. Therefore, this paper 
evaluates these IAM standards to ascertain suitable IAM to 
protect mobile computing and communications. Three types 
of analyses are examined: comparative analysis, suitability 
analysis and security vulnerability analysis of SAML, OAuth 
and OIDC. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II 
elucidates SAML, OAuth and OIDC use cases for mobile 
computing and communication; Section III expounds the com- 
parative analysis of these IAM standards; Section IV critically 
evaluates the suitability of these IAM standards for mobile 
computing and communication; Section V performs security 
vulnerability analysis of IAM standards; Section VI concludes 
the paper and suggests some future work. 
 
II. SAML, OAUTH AND OIDC USE CASES FOR MOBILE 
COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATION 
A. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
SAML is an XML-based framework developed by OASIS 
for communicating user’s information related to authentication 
and authorization [9]. It permits the two federated partners to 
select and share necessary identity attributes they require in a 
SAML message/assertion provided that they can be represented 
in XML [8]. A typical use case of SAML for mobile computing 
and communication and its corresponding steps are illustrated 
in Fig. 1 [3]. 
   
 
Fig. 1.   A SAML Use Case for Mobile Computing and Communication 
 
 
B. Open Authorization (OAuth) 
OAuth is mainly an authorization protocol. OAuth facili- 
tates a user to permit access to an application to accomplish 
approved functions on behalf of the user [10]. Accordingly, 
it empowers an external application to gain restricted access 
to an HTTP service. A typical OAuth use case for mobile 
computing and communication and its corresponding steps are 
illustrated in Fig. 2 [3]. 
 
 
C. OpenID Connect (OIDC) 
OpenID Connect is a framework for transmitting identity 
by using RESTful APIs [8]. OpenID Connect is not a new 
protocol rather it is a successor of OpenID 2.0 and developed 
as a profile of OAuth 2.0 [8]. OpenID Connect uses two main 
tokens: an Access Token and an ID Token. A typical use case 
of OIDC for mobile computing and communication and its 
corresponding steps are illustrated in Fig. 3 [3]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.   An OAuth Use Case for Mobile Computing and Communication 
Fig. 3.   An OIDC Use Case for Mobile Computing and Communication 
 
 
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF IAM STANDARDS: 
SAML, OAUTH AND OIDC 
Table I illustrates the comparative analysis of the three 
predominant IAM standards SAML, OAuth and OIDC on the 
basis of several explored criteria for this particular analysis 
[1], [3]. 
 
IV. SUITABILITY ANALYSIS OF SAML, OAUTH AND 
OIDC FOR MOBILE COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATION 
The previous analysis has revealed the features, merits and 
limitations of SAML, OAuth and  ODIC  standards.  SAML 
and OIDC both are a complete solution for the authentication 
and authorization in for mobile computing and communication 
system, though OAuth should be used for an authorization, 
therefore, this analysis excludes it as an option. 
An IAM standard should be a lightweight standard for 
mobile computing and communication systems. They should 
be able to apply data compression for reducing their size and 
network traffic by removing unnecessary data [7], [11], [12]. 
It should be compact and faster to manage as compared to 
other communication protocols used in mobile communication 
networks. SAML is an XML-oriented specification and the 
representation of XML trees is quite verbose. Every element 
of a tree is surrounded in a pair of tags with its name/ element 
type. While OIDC is a JSON-oriented specification and the 
representation of JSON trees is less verbose than XML as 
it is  in the  form a  nested array type  analogous to  that of 
JavaScript. Consequently, the more compact size of OIDC 
makes it the preferred choice for communication in HTML 
and HTTP environments than SAML [13]. 
Mobile-based Single Sign-On (SSO) is one of the essential 
requirements for mobile users. Mobile users access a large 
number of apps and services and for them they require distinct 
authentication and authorization [14]. This leads to several 
issues such as remembering many passwords, regular login to 
the same app or service, regular password change, phishing, 
and password recovery. As a result, organizational productivity 
is affected adversely. One of the common solutions is Single 
Sign-On (SSO) which offers a centralized, and user-friendly 
TABLE I. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT STANDARDS: SAML, OAUTH AND 
OIDC 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction Year 2005 2012 2014 
2.  Authentication  and 
Authorization 
It  is  a  standard  for  
authentication  and 
authorization. 
It is a standard for authorization 
(delega- 
tion) of resources. 
It  is  a  standard  for  
authentication  and 
authorization. 
3. Main Purpose Identity and Access Management 
(IAM), 
Single Sign-On (SSO) for enterprise 
users. 
API authorization between 
Applications. 
Identity and Access Management 
(IAM), 
Single Sign-On (SSO) for 
consumers. 4. Token Format XML XML, JSON, JWT JSON, JWT 
5. Token Content Token contains user identity 
information 
but not credentials. 
Token contains user identity 
information 
but not credentials. 
Token contains user identity 
information 
but not credentials. 
6. Security of Token 
(Integrity/Non-repudiation) 
XML Signature  HMAC or X.509; 
SAML 
tokens are almost always signed 
with a private key, as it is a 
trusted relationship between IdP 
and SP. 
Default bearer token has no proof 
of pos- 
session. However, token contents 
can be protected by using a DS or 
a MAC. 
JSON   Web   Signature   (JWS)-   
HMAC 
SHA-256 or X.509; [Additional 
Support 
-RSA SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 
SHA- 256]. 
7.  Security  of  Token 
(Confidentiality/ Privacy) 
XML Encryption- Triple-DES-CBC 
with 
192-bit key and a 64-bit 
initialization Vec- tor (IV), AES-
CBC with a 128-bit ini- tialization 
vector (IV); [TLS-SSL, Web 
Services Security (WSS)]. 
TLS  is  mandatory  to  implement  
with 
OAuth for token confidentiality. 
However, token encryption must be 
applied in addi- tion to the usage 
of TLS protection. 
JSON   Web   Encryption   (JWE)-   
RSA- 
PKCS1-1.5 with 2048-bit key, 
AES-128- CBC, and  AES-256-
CBC; [Additional Support- 
ECDH-ES with 256-bit key, 
AES-128-GCM, and AES-256-
GCM]. 
8. Lightweight Standard It  is  not  a  lightweight  standard.  
XML 
states trees in a verbose form. 
Every el- ement in the tree has a 
name (the element type name), and 
the element must be enclosed in a 
matching pair of tags. 
It is a lightweight standard. JSON 
states 
trees in a nested array type of 
notation similar to that of 
Javascript. Indeed, a JSON 
document can exactly be parsed as 
Javascript to result in the 
corresponding array. 
It  is  a  lightweight  standard.  
Similar  to 
OAuth. JSON has a much smaller 
gram- mar and maps. 
9. Protocol Used XML, HTTP, SOAP JSON, HTTP, REST JSON, HTTP, REST 
10. Schemas and 
Deployments 
SPML, SCIM SCIM SCIM 
11. Platform Independent, 
Vendor-Neutral and Open 
Standard 
It  is  a  platform  independent,  
vendor- 
neutral and open standard. 
However, flex- ibility in the 
implementation leads to the 
different design models. 
It  is  a  platform  independent,  
vendor- 
neutral and open standard. 
However, flex- ibility in the 
implementation leads to the 
different design models. 
It  is  a  platform  independent,  
vendor- 
neutral and open standard. It also 
stan- dardised many parameters 
such as in- stance scopes, endpoint 
discovery, and dy- namic 
registration of clients, which were 
left up to implementers in the 
OAuth 2.0 implementation. 
12.  Web   and  Native  
Mobile 
Apps Support 
It  is  specially  designed  for  Web  
apps. 
However, HTTP artifact binding 
can be used to reduce the flow 
of SAML mes- sages through the 
browser. 
It supports both Web and native 
mobile 
Apps. 
It supports both Web and native 
mobile 
Apps. 
13. Mobile Standard It is limited in its ability to s pport 
m bil  
and smart-TV devices. 
It has been designed for the 
mobile API 
and therefore it is also known as a 
token in your mobile. 
It has been working towards 
standardising 
a  GSMA  Mobile  Connect  
standard  for mobile devices. 
14.  Enterprise  and  
Consumer 
Support 
It  mainly  supports  enterprise  
users  be- 
cause it involves SP and IdP. 
It supports enterprise users, and 
consumer 
apps and services. 
It supports enterprise users, and 
consumer 
apps and services. 
15.  Fixed  and  Mobile 
Telecom Examples 
British     Telecom,     France     
Telecom, 
Deutsche Telekom, NTT 
DoCoMo, National IT and 
Telecom Agency of Denmark. 
Deutsche  Telekom,  Orange,  T-
Mobile, 
Tata, AT&T, Vodafone, Telecom 
Italia, TAT&T, France Telecom, 
China Mobile, China Telecom, 
Etisalat, KDDI, Telenor, 
Telefonica, Telstra. 
Deutsche  Telekom,  Orange,  
Vodafone, 
Telecom Italia, AT&T,  France 
Telecom, China Mobile, China 
Telecom, Etisalat, KDDI, Tata, 
Telefonica, Telenor, Telstra. 
 
 
OAut
h  
and secure method of authenticating [15]. SAML and OIDC 
both are capable to offer the SSO functionality but OIDC is a 
relatively more user-friendly SSO approach for small mobile 
devices. 
 
Mobile applications are a combination of applications 
written in native, web and hybrid languages. JSON is derived 
from JavaScript programming language, and its parsers are 
most commonly available in other programming languages, 
because they map directly to objects. XML was not designed 
for programming and the sole purpose of XML was to transport 
the data over on the Web. Therefore, it does not have a natural 
document-to-object mapping. JWT is an industry standard and 
is universally accepted on the Internet, offering the 
simplicityof client  side handling  of the  JWT  on multiple  
platforms, particularly, mobile [13]. Therefore, the use of 
JWT in the development of mobile apps is common as it is 
relatively more compatible than SAML assertions. 
 
Mobile browsers are constrained in the maximum URL 
size they can support. Additionally, WebView has many limi- 
tations such as preventing the sharing of cookies, certificates, 
and HTML local storage. OIDC  uses  JWT  that  does  not 
use sessions, therefore, it has no issues with native mobile 
applications and WebView. Thus, OIDC specification is suited 
for both Web browsers and WebViews (native mobile apps) 
whilst SAML is only for Web browsers. However, HTTP 
Artifact binding can be used to reduce the flow of SAM 
messages through the browser. Alternatively, SAML can be 
used for only authentication and, subsequently, OAuth can be 
used for authorization, where the SAML assertion can be used 
as the OAuth bearer token in the HTTP bearer header to access 
protected resources. 
Mobile communication is substantially based on the use 
of mobile devices, where, the authentication and authorization 
heavily rely on mobile objects, protocols and standards. SAML 
offers an inadequate support for mobile devices because of 
its old construction as it was developed in 2005, before the 
introduction of first smart phone. While OIDC was introduced 
recently in 2014 and offered features for mobile, IoT and web. 
OIDC has also standardised a separate version mobile device 
known as GSMA Mobile Connect standard. 
The authentication and authorization requirements may 
vary from one business model to another such as enterprise- 
to-enterprise, enterprise-to-consumer, or within an enterprise. 
A large segment of the mobile communication market is 
associated with consumers only; therefore, any IAM standard 
should provide support to consumers’ authentication and au- 
thorization. The architectural design of SAML requires service 
provider (SP) enterprise and identity provider (IdP) enterprise, 
and a trustworthy relationship, therefore, it  is  mostly  suit- 
able for enterprise users (i.e., enterprise-to-enterprise). While, 
OIDC design is also focused on end users and, therefore, it is 
suitable for both enterprises and consumers and all business 
models in case of untrusted third party association. 
Security is always a great concern in mobile communica- 
tions due to its insecure channels and it is more disposed to 
eavesdropping attacks [16]. It requires two main protections; 
confidential information should be protected from revelation 
to unauthorized users, and the protection of security tokens 
which should not be tampered with or altered during its entire 
life cycle. For maintaining these two security provisions, strong 
encryption techniques and digital signatures or MAC should be 
incorporated in an IAM standard. SAML XML tokens can be  
 
 
signed using XML Signature (XML-Sig) based on a secret key 
(using the HMAC algorithm) or a public/private key pair (in 
the form of a X.509 Certificate). In practice, SAML tokens 
aregenerally signed with a private key because of the 
established relationship between IdP and SP. SAML XML 
token data can be encrypted using XML Encryption (XML-
Enc) based on a secret key (Triple-DES-192, AES-128) or 
public/private key pair (RSA-PKCS1-1.5-192, RSA-OAEP-
128/256). However, signing a part of the message, creating an 
overlapping signature and adding or subtracting text after 
signature features make it vulnerable for a number of new 
security threats. Furthermore, computing and verifying XML 
signatures is very resource intensive [17]. OIDC JSON Web 
Tokens can be signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) based 
on a secret key (with HMAC algorithm) or a public/private 
key pair (in the form of a X.509 Certificate). OIDC JWT 
data can be encrypted using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) 
based on a secret key (AES-128-CBC, and AES-256-CBC) or 
public/private key pair (RSA-PKCS1-1.5-2048, ECDH-ES-
256). However, some JWT libraries treat tokens signed with the 
none algorithm as a valid token with a verified signature, which 
allows arbitrary account access on some systems [18]. SAML 
and OIDC both offer strong security features. Nonetheless, 
complexity in signing XML with XML Digital Signatures 
may leave some security holes as compared to the simplicity 
of signing JSON [13]. Moreover, JWT does not use sessions 
while SAML does; which prevents OIDC from many attacks 
related to sessions including Cross-Site Request Forgery 
(CSRF), thus, more secure for mobile computing and 
communication. 
Based on the previous two analyses, it is obvious that 
SAML requires a revamp in order to make it suitable for 
mobile computing and communication. OAuth is suitable for 
an authorization only but not for an authentication. OAuth is a 
supportive protocol for both SAML and OIDC. It is already an 
essential component of OIDC specification while, it can also 
be used with SAML to make it more suitable and lightweight 
for mobile computing and communication. OpenID Connect 
would be the most suitable choice for mobile computing and 
communication because it satisfies most of the requirements 
for them. Nonetheless, it is a developing standard and requires 
wider acceptance for becoming an established IAM standard 
for mobile computing and communication. 
 
V. SECURITY VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY 
AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 
This analysis illustrates that flawed deployment of the pow- 
erful SAML and OIDC (OAuth is a part of OIDC) frameworks 
may be easily exploited for attacks. 
 
A. Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack 
1) DoS Attack in SAML: SAML provides two common 
message flows, an SP-initiated and IdP-initiated, and two 
common SAML messages, an Authentication Request message 
sent from an SP to an IdP, and a Response message, containing 
a SAML assertion, sent from the IdP to the SP. An Authenti- 
cation Request message can be sent from an SP to an IdP via 
the HTTP Redirect Binding, HTTP POST Binding, or HTTP 
Artefact Binding; and the Response message can be sent from 
an IdP to an SP via the HTTP POST Binding or the HTTP 
Artefact Binding [19], [20], [21]. Furthermore, SAML permits 
asymmetry in the message pair, allowing a different binding 
on the return message to that of the initiating message. The 
decision of which binding to use, is made according to the 
configuration settings at the SP and the IdP sides [22]. 
 
 
A DoS attack in SAML is possible when the SP-Initiated 
SSO (Redirect/POST Bindings) message flow is 
implemented. The user tries to access a resource on the SP, 
but the identity is managed by the IdP. Thus, the user is 
sent to the IdP to log on and the IdP delivers a SAML 
web SSO assertion for the user’s federated identity to the 
SP. This exchange uses a Redirect Binding for the SP-to-
IdP AuthnRequest message and a POST Binding for the 
IdP-to-SP Response message. Here, an attacker can target 
the IdP by sending abundance of requests by compromising 
valid users or an honest SP because the SAML request 
requires substantial processing overheads. The effort 
required for processing of each Response assertion is 
significantly greater than the effort required by an attacker 
to generate the request [23]. This could easily overwhelm 
the SAML IdP. 
2) DoS Attack in OIDC: In OIDC discovery process, 
it is necessary to obtain OIDC IdP’s configuration 
information. The OIDC IdP allows metadata discovery 
and therefore, it hosts its configuration information at the 
endpoint. In most of the implementations, the endpoint is 
accessible by any client/RP who is wishing to send 
registration request and thus, it is publicly open and possibly 
non-secure. Subsequently, OIDC client/RP sends an HTTP 
GET request to this metadata endpoint to obtain the 
configuration information of the OIDC IdP. The OIDC IdP 
sends a response which is a set  of Claims about the OIDC 
provider’s configuration, including all necessary endpoints 
and public key location information that can be used by 
client/RP for further communication with the OIDC IdP or 
the OAuth authorization server. 
A DoS attack in OIDC is possible when the endpoint is 
publicly open and non-secure, and dynamic discovery process 
is allowed without any authentication. This vulnerability can 
be easily exploited for DoS attack on an OIDC IdP and flooded 
by countless dynamic discovery requests, which could easily 
overwhelm the OIDC IdP [24]. Additionally, this dynamic 
discovery process may be exploited for DoS attack on the 
client/RP, an attacker may try to spoof an OpenID IdP by pub- 
lishing a discovery information that contains an issuer Claims 
using the Issuer URL of the OIDC IdP being impersonated, but 
with its own endpoints and signing keys. Thus, the client/RP 
can be flooded with information by attacker. 
 
B. Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack 
1) MITM Attack in SAML: A MITM attack is possible in 
SAML when the SP-Initiated SSO (POST/Artefact Bindings) 
message flow is implemented. This exchange uses a POST 
Binding for the SP-to-IdP AuthnRequest message and an 
Artefact Binding for the IdP-to-SP Response message [22]. 
The user tries to access a resource on the SP but the identity 
is managed by the IdP. The user enters correct credentials and 
a local logon related security setting is generated for the user at 
the IdP. Later, the IdP creates an artefact containing the source 
ID for its website and a reference to the Response message 
(the MessageHandle). The HTTP Artefact binding permits the 
choice of either HTTP redirection or an HTML form POST 
as a way to deliver the artefact to the SP [19]. 
The SP’s Assertion Consumer Service sends a SAML Ar- 
tifactResolve message, which contains the artefact to the IdP’s 
Artefact Resolution Service endpoint using the synchronous 
SOAP binding. The IdP’s Artefact Resolution Service extracts 
the MessageHandle from the artefact and finds the original 
SAML Response message accompanying with it [19]. The 
retrieved message is placed in a SAML ArtifactResponse  
 
 
message that is returned to the SP using the synchronous SOAP 
binding. The SP extracts and processes the Response message 
and the embedded assertion for creating a local logon security 
setting for the user at the SP [19]. 
In this SAML SP-Initiated SSO (POST/Artefact Bindings) 
process, the SOAP binding is used which is vulnerable to the 
MITM attack [25]. The RelayState token is not a transparent 
reference to state information which is maintained at the SP. 
This RelayState mechanism can leak information about the 
user’s activities at the SP to the IdP if the SP deployment 
is erroneous  or some  other kind of  existing vulnerabilities 
which may also lead to the MITM attack [26]. Since the HTTP 
Artefact binding will be used to deliver the SAML Response 
message, it is not compulsory that this assertion be digitally 
signed which is also a great security risk and increases the 
chances of the MITM attack in SAML. MITM Attack  in 
OIDC: A MITM attack is  possible in OIDC when the OIDC 
dynamic client registration process is happened.  For 
registering  a  new OIDC  client/RP at  the Authorization 
Server, the client/RP sends an HTTP POST mes- sage including 
its metadata to the Client Registration Endpoint with a content 
type of application/JSON, and the parameters represented as 
top-level elements of the root JSON object. The subsequent 
response may carry a Registration Access Token, which can 
be used by the client/RP to accomplish required tasks upon 
the resulting client/RP registration. The OIDC IdP may require 
an Initial Access Token to limit registration re- quests to only 
authorized clients or developers [24]. However, to support an 
open dynamic registration, the Client Registration Endpoint 
should accept registration requests without OAuth 2.0 Access 
Tokens. Therefore, the dynamic client registration could be 
the potential source of many attacks including the MITM 
attack. 
This MITM attack may be caused by a logical flaw in 
the OAuth 2.0 protocol or the presence of a malicious OIDC 
IdP or malicious client/RP [27], [28]. A malicious OIDC IdP 
can trick the  client/RP  into  sending  an  authorization  code 
to the attacker’s Token Endpoint. Once a code is stolen, an 
attacker can modify information of authorization requests and 
responses for confusing the RP into binding an authorization to 
the wrong user [29]. Consequently, the confused RP may select 
wrong IdP at the start of the authentication or authorization 
process [27], [28]. This permits a hacker to modify user data 
and fool the RP into treating it as the IdP the user wants [27], 
[28]. Accordingly, the RP sends the authorisation code or the 
access token issued by the honest IdP to the attacker depending 
on the OAuth mode employed. Finally, an attacker can utilise 
this information for login into the client/RP under the user’s 
identity (managed by the honest IdP) or accessing the user’s 
protected resources at the honest IdP [27], [28]. 
 
C. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attack 
1) XSS Attack in SAML: An XSS attack in SAML, an 
exploitation of the vulnerability of the erroneous deployment 
of SAML framework assists an attacker to perform steadily 
trapping a user by visiting URIs that may be vulnerable to 
XSS attacks [30]. This is a quite severe XSS attack, since the 
client is not suspicious in receiving an altered resource. Also, 
a Response used in SAML process could possibly contain 
unencoded data supplied by an untrusted source. Therefore, 
an attacker could use this to start an XSS attack by redirecting 
a user to a maliciously crafted URL. Besides the issue of 
SAML Response, a basic deployment of SAML exposes the 
RelayState field to a probable injection of malicious code 
which may be executed at the honest SP side. 
 
 
2) XSS Attack in OIDC: An XSS attack in OIDC, an 
attacker exploits the facility of an automatic authorization 
granting by which an automatic authorization response is 
created if a user had recently a session with the OIDC IdP 
and previously granted authorization for the same client/RP 
[31]. Using this facility, an attacker may be able to steal a 
user ac- cess token by exploiting an XSS vulnerability in the 
client/RP side. Presently, this vulnerability revealed in 
Android’s built- in browser has been exploited for this 
XSS attack. Where, an attacker utilises a browser 
window.open event for sending a counterfeit authorization 
request to OIDC authorization server, in which response 
type=code is altered to response type=code token id token. 
Other similar vulnerabilities related to features and flawed 
deployment of OIDC may also be exploited for XSS 
attacks. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented the evaluation of three popular IAM 
standards, SAML, OAuth and OIDC to ascertain  suitable 
IAM to protect mobile computing and communication. This 
evaluation is based on the three types of analyses: comparative 
analysis, suitability analysis and security vulnerability analysis 
of SAML, OAuth and OIDC. SAML was developed before 
smart mobile phones were introduced, and therefore it has 
many legacy features, which are not compatible with mobile 
computing and communication and would require a revamp 
to make it a  more  suitable  IAM.  OAuth  is  suitable  for 
an authorization only but not for an authentication. OpenID 
Connect would be the best choice for mobile computing and 
communication as it fulfils maximum requirements for them. 
Nonetheless, it is a developing standard and requires wider 
acceptance for becoming an established IAM standard for 
mobile computing and communication. In the future, it may 
be interesting to perform practical investigations on SAML, 
OAuth and OIDC for mobile computing and communication 
systems. 
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